The African military in an age of democracy (III)

[Mirror]

The best contribution the military can make to democracy is to stay out of politics. Institutional incentives should be geared to wider, national objectives rather than those narrow, elite and often patronage-driven interests linked to one or another political party or personality.

But here, further different taxonomy can be developed, a categorization of African military capabilities – distinguishing at least in terms of peacekeeping capacity between 'enablers', 'providers' and 'followers'.

The reality is that the African military is generally under-resourced for the roles it is expected to assume, financially and in terms of available skills and equipment. Obviously, as with every area of government, hard choices will have to be made.

Inevitably the biggest African gaps exist, as in most areas of government, in management, logistics and, more controversially, in the way in which militaries can and should respond to development needs.

One important principal stands out. While there are sometimes exceptional circumstances (the fight against Nazism is one), the military cannot be stronger than the national economy can afford.

A corollary is that it should not do anything to undermine the economy. This includes the furthering of elite over na-tional interests. The traditional notion is for armies to deal with development as a 'secondary' role through engineering inputs and disaster relief. But there is a more explicit security aspect.

The experience of agriculture development specialists working with the US special forces, for example, in Afghanistan, shows that promoting better techniques not only led to 350 percent increases in yields but a tenfold reduction in IEDs in some of the most insecure districts of the restive Kandahar province.

All these raise questions about where and how external actors might assist African militaries as they continue their transition out of politics to traditional roles and capacities. External assistance should be guided in this regard by sustainability, cohesion and relevance.

Changes that are instigated by outsiders but cannot endure without their support, have historically failed and should not be attempted. Understanding thus why solutions fail is essential. It usually goes beyond money, and to the heart of the design of the solution, and to the extent of local ownership.

External assistance should also distinguish between explicit military support and strengthening the civil institutions in which they are located or those the military have to work with, including the police. Above all else, leadership mentoring, and especially training for local budgetary, procurement and logistics processes would help to reinforce the essence of a modern military.

Soldiers seldom have to be taught how to fight. It's the system that supports them which is lacking. Better systems can promote a positive cycle. Improved capacity and less stress over resources will in turn help to keep the military focused on national rather than political party interests.

CONCLUDED

National Mirror